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THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
DILEMMA 
John Galiette* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The pressing need for expanded energy sources has stimulated the 
proliferation of nuclear power plants and evoked heated debate con-
cerning their benefits, hazards, and waste disposal problems. I A 
prime source of contention in this debate has been the Price-
Anderson Act, 2 which sets a $560 million ceiling on the total amount 
of damages recoverable by the victims of a nuclear accident. Ralph 
Nader, for example, has commented that "[i]n the history of com-
mon law in the United States it has not been our practice to ... 
limit liability in one industry," concluding that "the people of this 
country should not have to expose their assets to risk" in order to 
support the nuclear power industry.3 
The constitutionality of Price-Anderson has been attacked in only 
two cases. In Conservation Society of Southern Vermont v. AEC,4 
environmental groups opposed to the spread of nulcear power facili-
ties asserted that the Act contributed to the construction and opera-
tion of such facilities in violation of their interests, and requested 
the court to declare the Act unconstitutional under the due process 
clause of the Fifth Amendment.5 The district court dismissed the 
action for lack of justiciability,8 and the decision was not appealed. 
• Staff member, ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
1 See Great Nuclear Debate, TIME, Dec. 8, 1975, at 36; How Safe is Safe Enough?, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG., June 20, 1976, at 54. 
2 42 U.S.C. § 2210 et seq. (1970). 
3 Quoted in [1977] 7 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1915. 
• No. 19-72 (D.D.C. Apr. 16,1975), reprinted in 121 CONGo REO. S22360 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 
1975). 
• U.S. CONST. amend. V reads: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law .... " 
, Conservation Society of Southern Vermont V. AEC, No. 19-72 (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 1975), 
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In Carolina Environmental Study Group v. AEC,7 a group of citi-
zens claimed to be injured by the operation of a nuclear power plant 
near their homes in North Carolinas and brought suit against the 
AEC and Duke Power Company, a nuclear utility, seeking a decla-
ration that Price-Anderson's limitation of liability unconstitu-
tionally denied them both due process' and equal protection of the 
laws,IO as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Judge McMillan 
held for the plaintiffs, and the case is now before the United States 
Supreme Court. ll 
Since no nuclear incidents requiring the invocation of Price-
Anderson's limited remedies have occurred, plaintiffs challenging 
the constitutionality of the Act have been forced to base their claims 
on harms other than inadequate compensation. Claimants in both 
Vermont Society and Carolina Study Group alleged the presence of 
injuries resulting from the proliferation of nuclear power 
plants-injuries due to a constant exposure to minor harms such as 
continuous emissions of low levels of radiation and small scale ecol-
ogical changes near the facilites, as well as injuries based on the fear 
of a smaller catastrophe such as a "core melt" or major radiation 
leak which would contaminate vast tracts of land and people.12 The 
Vermont Society plaintiffs focused on the general detrimental effect 
of these injuries on society as a whole, while the Carolina Study 
Group plaintiffs argued the particular detrimental effect on them-
selves personally. In addition, the Vermont Society claimants em-
phasized Price-Anderson's role in fostering the construction of 
harmful nuclear power plants, while the Carolina Study Group 
claimants emphasized the inadequacy of the Act as a tort remedy 
for nuclear injuries. These varying approaches profoundly affected 
the judicial responses to the claims. The Vermont Society suit was 
reprinted in 121 CONGo REc. S22360 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1975). 
, 431 F. Supp. 203 (W.D.N.C. 1977). 
• Id. at 205. 
I U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
'" The equal protection guarantee applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment is 
applicable to the federal government through the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment. Johnson V. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 364 n.4 (1974); Bolling V. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 
(1954). 
II This case was decided by the Supreme Court in June. Duke Power CO. V. Carolina 
Environmental Study Group, 46 U.S.L.W. 4845 (1978). Although this article was written prior 
to the decision, it substantially agrees with the Court's reasoning . 
• 2 See Great Nuclear Debate, TIME, Dec. 8, 1975, at 36; Estep, Radiation Injuries and 
Statistics: The Need for a New Approach to Injury Litigation, 59 MICH. L. REv. 259 (1960). 
A "core melt" occurs when a loss of reactor coolants causes the heat continuously emitted 
by the radioactive fuel core to melt the reactor's containment walls. 
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perceived as questioning the soundness of a congressional policy and 
so fell beyond the permissible scope of judicial review; the Carolina 
Study Group case was seen as questioning the validity of a 
legislatively-imposed tort remedy, thereby falling within traditional 
court concerns. 
This article will utilize the two cases as a framework for analyzing 
the constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act. The article will first 
trace the legislative history of Price-Anderson. It will then analyze 
the constitutionality of the Act as investigated in the two lawsuits. 
Finally, the article will compare the statutory recovery mechanism 
provided by Price-Anderson with the common law mechanism 
which it supplants. 
n. THE PRICE-ANDERSON Acr IN CONGRESS 
From its legislative birth the Price-Anderson Act has been con-
ceived as providing both a tort recovery mechanism for nuclear 
accident victims and an incentive for the development of a private 
nuclear industry. Prior to 1954, nuclear research and development 
was conducted under military supervision pursuant to the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1946.13 With passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954,14 nuclear policy shifted, emphasizing private investment in 
nuclear energy programs15 under rigid federal regulatory control and 
licensing. Soon after the enactment of this legislation, however, the 
unwillingness of private corporations to subject their assets to the 
possibly astronomic liability claims of those injured by a nuclear 
accident became apparent,18 as did the reluctance of the insurance 
companies to provide coverage for more than a fraction of the total 
estimated liabilityY In 1957, Congress enacted the Price-Anderson 
Act in an attempt to promote the private development of atomic 
13 42 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. (1970) (transferred). 
14 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. (1970). 
II 42 U.S.C. § 2013(d) (1970); S. REP. No. 1699, 83rd Cong., 2d Se88., reprinted in [1954] 
U.S. CODE CONGo & An. NEWS 3456, 3459-61. 
\I S. REP. No. 296, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1957] U.S. CODE CONGo & An. NEWS 
1803, 1803. Although Congre88 believed unlimited liability was not "the most important 
deterrent-that appears to be the current lack of economic incentive," id. a staff attorney 
for the AEC later wrote that it was "well recognized by all partieS" that unlimited liability 
was a "substantial deterrent, even if not a 'roadblock,' to the fledgling [private] nuclear 
power industry." However, it was believed that its emphasis might cause public apprehension 
as to the safety of nuclear power. Green, Nuclear Power: Risk, Liability, and Indemnity, 71 
MICH. L. REv. 479, 490 (1973). 
17 S. REP. No. 296, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1957] U.S. CODE CONGo & An. NEWS 
1803,1808. 
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energy by removing the threat of unlimited liability.18 However, 
establishing an incentive to nuclear power was not Congress' sole 
purpose in enacting the Act. The legislation was also designed to 
protect the public by providing funds for payment of any liability 
claims arising from a nuclear incident. 18 Congress sought to ensure 
that some recovery fund be available to claimants even if the nu-
clear user were left with few or no assets following an accident.2O 
This dual purpose exemplifies the congressional perception of the 
Act as both a remedy and a policy. 
Price-Anderson initially imposed a ceiling on a nuclear user's po-
tential liability for injuries resulting from the operation of atomic 
facilities21 equal to the maximum amount of insurance coverage 
privately available plus $500 million in additional government in-
demnification. 22 This limitation applied only to those licenses to be 
issued before August 1, 1967, a ten-year period during which Con-
gress hoped additional information on nuclear energy could be ob-
tained.23 Congress based its authority to enact this legislation on 
several of its constitutional powers. 24 The lawmakers reasoned that 
interests of national security25 were involved in the policy decision 
to develop the private nuclear industry, and that the bankruptcy 
clause28 empowered them to act to limit the victims' remedies in 
light of the likelihood of economically disastrous damage claims 
against a nuclear user. The power to regulate interstate commerce,27 
the power to protect the public health and safety,28 and the power 
'8 [d. at 1803. 
" [d. at 1810. 
20 The Committee's concern with this purpose was more sub silentio than forthright; the 
Committee Report speaks more of the low probability of a nuclear accident than of ensuring 
recovery in the event of one. [d. at 1803-04, 1807-08. Although they were establishing govern-
mental indemnity, the committee members apparently believed it was a precaution and that 
use of the indemnity would be unlikely. 
21 42 U.S.C. § 221O(e) (1970). 
22 [d. §§ 2210(c), (d). 
23 S. REP. No. 296, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1957] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 
1803, 1811. 
.. Statements of the constitutional bases for congressional authority appear in the statute, 
42 U.S.C. § 2012 (1970), and in a memorandum prepared in 1965 by then Deputy Attorney 
General Ramsey Clark, Memorandum Re Constitutionality of Section 170e of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954, 121 CONGo REc. S22361 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1975) [hereinafter cited as 
Memo). 
23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
,. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
21 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
28 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
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to promote the general welfare of the nation,29 provided additional 
bases for congressional authority. 
Congress continued to invoke energy policy justifications for its 
subsequent alterations of Price-Anderson. In the 1965 amend-
ments,30 which included the Act's extension to August 1, 1977, the 
Senate emphasized the continuing need for a strong nuclear power 
industry to meet the nation's increasing energy demands. The Sen-
ate also noted the benefit of Price-Anderson in acting as an incen-
tive to nuclear development without requiring direct expenditures 
of federal funds, thereby freeing federal monies for use on advanced 
theoretical nuclear projects not properly undertaken by private 
profit-seeking users.31 
Although Congress offered such justifications for its actions in 
extending and modifying Price-Anderson, the actual amendments 
to the Act did not focus on the legislation as an incentive to nuclear 
development, but rather sought to improve the Act's operation as a 
tort remedy. In the 1965 modifications, Congress limited aggregate 
liability for a single nuclear incident to an absolute ceiling of $560 
million.32 Relying on accident estimates by the AEC, the lawmakers 
concluded that the limitation "does not, as a practical matter, de-
tract from the public protection afforded by this legislation. "33 Con-
gress also noted with concern that plant operators could interpose 
certain technical tort defenses to block the successful prosecution of 
a nuclear victim's claim.34 For instance, proof ofthe causal relation-
ship between the nuclear occurrence and a physical disease such as 
cancer might be difficult, especially where the injury resulted from 
excessive radiation.3s Moreover, where the damage is discovered sev-
eral years after the occurrence of the injury (an extremely likely 
occurrence when moderate doses of radiation" are involved), statute 
of limitation problems could arise.lIe In 1966, Congress directly ad-
dressed these concerns by enacting a statutory requirement that 
users of atomic energy waive certain common law defenses in ex-
20 1d. 
at Pub. L. No. 89-210, 79 Stat. 855 (1965), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2210(c) (1970). 
31 S. REP. No. 650, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1965] U.S. CODE CONGo & An. NEWS 
3209, 3213-18. 
3Z 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (1970). 
33 S. REp. No. 650, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1965] U.S. CODE CONGo & An. NEWS 
3209,3214. 
34 S. REP. No. 1605, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONGo & An. 
NEWS 3201, 3203. 
35 1d. at 3203-04. 
31 "Green supra note 16, at 494-5. 
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change for federal indemnification;37 those waived are defenses re-
garding the negligence or fault of either the claimant or the person 
indemnified, the defense of assumption of the risk, and charitable 
or governmental immunity. To avoid the operation of state statutes 
of limitation, the Act also requires the waiver of any defenses based 
on such statutes if suit is instituted within three years from the date 
on which the claimant first knew, or reasonably should have known, 
of the injury or damage, but in no event more than ten years after 
the date of the nuclear incident. 38 
This waiver of defenses, however, does not apply to all suits 
against nuclear users, but is conditioned on a declaration by the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that "an extraordinary 
nuclear occurrence" has taken place.39 The statute defines such an 
occurrence as a "discharge or dispersal" of nuclear material "which 
the Commission determines to be substantial, and which the Com-
mission determines has resulted or will probably result in substan-
tial damages to persons offsite or property offsite."40 Although Con-
gress mandated the issuance of written criteria for determining 
whether an extraordinary nuclear occurrence has taken place,41 no 
such requlations have been promulgated. Such a broad statutory 
definition and the lack of written standards effectively give the NRC 
wide latitude in determining whether an extraordinary nuclear oc-
currence has taken place.42 Moreover, once the determination has 
been made, the NRC decision is unappealable. 43 This congressional 
scheme demonstrates a policy decision to require differing burdens 
of proof for continuing small-scale harms and extraordinary cata-
37 Pub. L. No. 89-645, 80 Stat. 891 (1966), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n) (1970). 
38 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(1) (1970); S. REP. No. 1605, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 
[1966] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3201,3227. 
31 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014(j), 2210(n) (1970). Pursuant to the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 
42 U.S.C. § 5841 et seq. (Supp. IV 1974), the AEC was abolished and replaced by the 
Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) 42 U.S.C. § 5811 et seq. (Supp. 
IV 1974) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 42 U.S.C: § 5841 et seq. (Supp. IV 
1974). Under the Energy Organization Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7101 et seq. (West Supp. 
1977), the functions of ERDA were transferred to the new Department of Energy, 42 U .S.C.A. 
§ 7151 (West Supp. 1977). Thus, the Department of Energy continues the research into 
nuclear energy begun under the AEC and ERDA, while the NRC is in charge of the former 
regulatory functions of the old AEC . 
.. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(j) (1970). 
" [d . 
.. S. REp. No. 1605, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 3201, 3212 . 
•• 42 U.S.C. § 2014(j) (1970). 
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strophic injuries,44 despite the application of the same limitation on 
liability to both types of injuries. 
The 1966 amendments also granted original jurisdiction over 
claims arising from a nuclear accident to the federal district court 
in the district where the accident occurred. 45 This court has author-
ity to make emergency payments to injured persons without requir-
ing a release of their claims, pending final resolution of the case}8 
Additionally, if the court determines that aggregate claims will ex-
ceed the liability limit, it must devise a plan for an equitable appor-
tionment of the fund among the claimants.47 This provision allows 
a degree of flexibility in the Price-Anderson recovery procedure. 
In 1975, Congress extended Price-Anderson to August 1, 1987}8 
However, Congress determined that the government's role as in-
demnitor should be phased out more quickly than provided for in 
the prior legislation, which had envisioned a rise in private insur-
ance coverage to replace government indemnity. 49 Consequently, 
the legislators added a "deferred premium system"50 under which 
every reactor will be assessed a "deferred premium" in the event of 
a nuclear incident. The size of this premium (ranging from $2 mil-
lion to $5 million per reactor) will depend on both the amount of 
available insurance and the number and size of reactors in opera-
tion. The government will indemnify the nuclear user for any claims 
exceeding the sum of the private insurance coverage and the de-
ferred premiums, up to the ceiling of $560 million. 51 As more reactors 
become operational, the total ofthe deferred premiums willeventu-
ally decrease the government's liability to zero; moreover, the aggre-
gate coverage to the claimants will rise above $560 million whenever 
the sum of the private insurance coverage and the deferred prem-
iums exceeds that value.52 Through this system of deferred prem-
, 
.. See text at note 12, supra . 
.. 42 U.S.C. §2210(n)(2) (1970). 
If [d. (0). 
" [d . 
.. Pub. L. No. 94-197, 89 Stat. 1111, 1113 (1975), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2210(c) (Supp. V 
1975) . 
.. S. REP. No. 454, 94th Cong., 1st. Sess., reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 
2251, 2251-52. 
50 42 U.S.C. § 221O(b) (Supp. V 1975). 
" [d.; S. REp. No. 454, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 2251, 2259-60. 
" For example, suppose that private insurance provides coverage of $125 million and that 
there are 100 reactors on line, each assessed at an average of $3 million. The total private 
fund would amount to $425 million, leaving the government an indemnitor for $135 million. 
If there are 150 reactors on line, with the same average assessment, the total private fund 
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iums, Congress hoped to guarantee the existence of a compensation 
fund for nuclear victims while at the same time keeping government 
contributions to a minimum. 
The lawmakers did not merely address the composition of the 
liability fund, but also reaffirmed their belief in the adequacy of the 
coverage under Price-Anderson, citing recent studies of the proba-
bility of a major nuclear accident.53 While conceding the possibility, 
however remote, of incidents causing several billions of dollars in 
damages, Congress asserted that the $560 million compensation 
fund provides adequate coverage for any "credible accident" which 
might occur. 54 
In sum, even in 1957, Congress was concerned with the Price-
Anderson Act as a tort recovery mechanism. All subsequent amend-
ments have been directed toward improving this mechanism, and 
not toward increasing the incentive to nuclear development. Thus, 
Congress has defined the dominant concern of the Act to be its 
legislatively imposed tort remedy. This congressional emphasis 
demands that any judicial review focus on the remedial aspects of 
the Act. 
III. THE PRICE-ANDERSON Acr IN COURT 
A. Justiciability 
A comparison of the court's treatment of the justiciability issue 
in Vermont Society and Carolina Study Group graphically illus-
trates the differing focuses of the two cases. Plaintiffs in the latter 
case succeeded by basing their claims on current personal injuries 
rather than on the potential harm to those "who might be injured 
in a nuclear accident. "55 These plaintiffs concretized their interest 
in nonproliferation by pleading the actual injuries which they alleg-
edly had already suffered. The Vermont Society plaintiffs, on the 
other hand, merely pleaded either general injuries to their personal 
interest in nonproliferation or particular injuries to unknown future 
claimants. This distinction created a sufficiently justiciable cause 
of action upon which the Carolina Study Group claimants could 
base their claims. 
would be $575 million, obviating any need for any government indemnity. The Senate Com-
mittee (in 1975) envisioned government indemnity dropping to zero by 1985. 
53 Id. at 2265-66 . 
.. Id. at 2266. 
55 Conservation Society of Southern Vermont v. AEC, No. 19-72 (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 1975), 
reprinted in 121 CONGo REC. S22360 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1975). 
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1) Standing 
The doctrine of standing focuses on the plaintiff involved and not 
on the issues being litigated; it inquires whether the plaintiff is the 
proper party to prosecute the cause of action.58 A dismissal· on stand-
ing grounds thus says nothing about the merits of the suit. The 
concept of standing stems from the "case or controversy" require-
ment of Article ITI of the United States Constitution. 57 Standing 
ensures the constitutionally-mandated concrete adverseness neces-
sary for a lawsuit. 58 Functionally, it limits access to scarce judicial 
resources.58 Standing also provides a vehicle for courts to dispose of 
"troublesome questions" which they consider unsuited for judicial 
determination.80 
Over the years, the Supreme Court has formulated differing tests 
of constitutional standing.81 The current test sets out a two-pronged 
.. Scott, Standing-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARv. L. REv. 645, 669 (1972). The Supreme 
Court has identified certain claimants for which there are separate tests-for example: tax-
payers, Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); citizens, Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to 
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); associations, Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); 
class action plaintiffs, O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); and, those seeking review of 
administrative actions, Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 
U.S. 150 (1970). The status of the plaintiff with respect to the claim he is litigating thus plays 
a significant role in determining standing. Broderick, The Warth Optional Standing Doc-
trine: Return to Judicial Supremacy? 25 CATH. U. L. REv. 467, 470-71 (1976). 
" Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). 
58 Baker v. Carr, 361 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). 
It Scott, supra note 56, at 670 . 
.. [d. at 683-84. 
8. Early attempts focused on the necessity for a plaintiff to show the violation of a legal 
interest before he could gain access to the courts. Tennessee Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley 
Authority, 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939). This test proved quite restrictive, and the claims of 
many plaintiffs were dismissed for failure to satisfy this threshold requirement. See, e.g., 
Perkins v. Luken Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1930) (competitive injury does not constitute 
violation of a legal interest). However, beginning in 1968, the Court undertook to loosen the 
requisites for standing. In its fledgling attempts, the Court focused on the implicit grants of 
standing which certain congressional legislation and constitutional provisions bestow on given 
classes of plaintiffs. For example, in Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968), the 
Court determined that those plaintiffs within the class which a statute is designed to protect 
have standing to sue to protect their interests under that statute. In Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 
83 (1968), a plaintiffs status as a taxpayer was deemed sufficient under the Constitution to 
challenge the legality of congressional spending activities. By such justifications, the Court 
implied that the judiciary was not itself granting standing, but merely effectuating the stand-
ing implicitly bestowed by Congress or the Constitution. But see Schlesinger v. Reservists 
Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (Flast distinguished). In two 1970 cases, 
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) and its 
companion case, Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970), the Court established a two-pronged 
standing test-injury in fact, plus the presence of an interest judged to be "arguably within 
the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee 
in question." 397 U.S. at 153. However, the "zone of interests" test proved to be no obstacle 
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requirement. First, the plaintiff must allege that he has suffered 
"injury in fact, economic or otherwise."82 While injury in fact may 
encompass non-economic harm, a plaintiff must allege facts suffi-
cient to show that he is himself among those harmed.83 A plaintiff 
will not achieve standing by alleging an abstract or generalized 
grievance common to all members of the public.84 And, while the 
harm may be prospective, the threat must be real and immediate, 
rather than remote or conjectural. 85 The second factor mandated by 
the court requires that a plaintiff demonstrate that his injury is-
"likely to be redressed by a favorable decision, "88 in effect necessi-
tating the establishment of a causal link to ensure that the court's 
remedy will in fact redress the alleged harm. This causation require-
ment ensures that the plaintiff has a sufficient personal stake in the 
outcome of the controversy. 
Satisfaction of the two-pronged requirements of constitutional 
standing does not necessarily guarantee that the court will hear the 
case. There is also a prudential aspect to standing. In Warth v. 
Seldin,87 Justice Powell asserted that, even if the plaintiffs' harm 
were sufficient to "satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement of 
Article ill, prudential considerations strongly counsel against ac-
cording [the plaintiffs] standing to prosecute this action."88 These 
prudential considerations incline the Court not to consider issues 
which could more effectively be directed to the elected branches of 
government. In addition, the Court can exercise a certain degree of 
flexibility in determining on other grounds whether or not to hear a 
case.8t 
The Vermont Society court, although not explicitly discussing 
to those plaintiffs pursuing constitutional challenges, since such claimants automatically 
fall within the "zone of interests" protected by the Constitution. See Sedler, Standing, 
Justiciability and All That: A Behavioral Analysis, 25 VAND. L. REV. 479, 486 (1972). 
12 Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53 
(1970). 
12 Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976); Sierra 
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972) . 
.. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1974); Schiesingerv. Reservists Com-
mittee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220-21 (1974). 
II Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41-2 (1976); 
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497-98 (1974). 
H Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976). 
17 422 U.S. 490 (1975). 
111d. at 514. 
H United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring); Styne and 
Van Aken, Warth v. Seldin: The Substantial Probability Test, 3 HAsTINGS CONST. L. Q. 485, 
513 (1976). 
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standing, did attempt to articulate the plaintiffs' alleged injury. 
The court initially stated that the injuries giving plaintiffs standing 
to sue were "the consequences of a proliferation of nuclear plants. "70 
However, later in the opinion, the court rejected that definition of 
the plaintiffs' interest, noting that "the interest in which 'plaintiffs' 
attack on the provision's validity is rooted is not their interest in 
nonproliferation [sic] atomic energy plants. Rather, it is the prop-
erty interest of those who might be injured in a nuclear accident."71 
Practically, the difference is inconsequential, since neither injury 
satisfactorily fulfills the requirements of constitutional standing. 
The former is an abstract and generalized grievance common to all 
members of the public,72 while the latter, conditioned on the possi-
ble occurrence of a nuclear incident, is conjectural in its assumption 
that some future nuclear victims will not be fully compensated 
under Price-Anderson73 and does not allege that plaintiffs are among 
the victims to be harmed by an inadequate recovery. 74 Therefore, 
under neither formulation of the harm did the Vermont Society 
plaintiffs satisfy the constitutional requirements of injury in fact. 
The Carolina Study Group plaintiffs based their standing on the 
presence of personally suffered injuries, namely a "small amount of 
chronic damage"75 (low level radiation and ecological changes) and 
an apprehension of "future, and perhaps major damage"18 (core 
melts or large scale radiation leakage) resulting from the operation 
of the nuclear plant. The former harm clearly constitutes an ade-
quate injury in fact. Plaintiffs' closeness to the plant and their sub-
sequent constant exposure to low level radiation gives them a con-
crete injury not shared by the public generally. On the other hand, 
the latter harm, if merely an abstract apprehension of injury, would 
fail to qualify as an adequate injury in fact.77 However, the plaintiffs 
asserted that this apprehension caused some of them to move from 
71 Conservation Society of Southern Vermont v. AEC, No. 19-72 (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 1975), 
reprinted in 121 CONGo REc. S22360 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1975). 
71 [d. 
72 See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists 
Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220-21 (1974). 
7S See Simon V. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41-2 (1976); 
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497-98 (1974). 
74 See Simon V. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976); 
Sierra Club V. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972). 
71 Carolina Environmental Study Group V. AEC, 431 F. Supp. 203, 218 (W.D.N.C. 1977). 
71 [d. 
77 See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972). 
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the area of the nuclear plant and caused at least one other to plan 
to do SO.78 These specific actions resulting from the plaintiffs' appre-
hension of injury should represent constitutionally sufficient harm. 
Having established an injury in fact, the Carolina Study Group 
plaintiffs still had to demonstrate that granting the relief they 
sought-a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Price-
Anderson-would redress their injuries. Plaintiffs reasoned that 
since the Act's limitation of liability caused the operation of nuclear 
power plants, and since operation of the Duke nuclear power plant 
caused constant exposure to minor harm and continuous apprehen-
sion of catastrophic injury to those living in its vicinity, Price-
Anderson's limited liability caused their injuries. The first premise, 
however, is open to question. Although witnesses at the 1957 con-
gressional hearings on Price-Anderson were definite in their belief 
that nuclear power plant expansion would cease without a limita-
tion on liability, witnesses in 1975 were more qualified in their asser-
tions. 79 Senator Tunney, opposing the 1975 extension of the Act, 
asserted that power plants will continue to be built and operated 
without Price-Anderson.8o Duke Power itself stated that it would 
continue its nuclear power plans with or without Price-Anderson.81 
Yet, while plaintiffs' assertion that nuclear power will cease to pro-
liferate in the absence of Price-Anderson is not unassailable, it 
should be sufficient to establish standing. Standing does not go to 
the merits of the cause of action, and, when analyzing this justicia-
bility issue, the court must decide all factual issues in the plaintiffs' 
favor. 82 The assertion that Price-Anderson causes the proliferation 
of nuclear plants is, although not conclusive, supported by enough 
78 Carolina Environmental Study Group v. AEC, 431 F. Supp. 203, 209 (W.D.N.C. 1977). 
" At the 1957 hearings of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, partially quoted in 
Carolina Environmental Study Group v. AEC, 431 F. Supp. 203, 215 (W.D.N.C. 1977), 
witnesses testified that: "The matter of protection against accidents and failures in the 
nuclear portion of a plant loom as the largest obstacle. . . . If the financial protection needed 
is not reasonably available, we will not be able to go ahead with the Westinghouse testing 
reactor [at Waltz Mill, Pa.]." Id. (emphasis by court). 
However, at the 1975 hearings of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, partially quoted 
in Carolina Environmental Study Group v. AEC, 431 F. Supp. 203, 215-18 (W.D.N.C. 1977), 
witnesses testified that: "Suppliers of nuclear system components ... will probably remain 
unwilling or reluctant to undertake new projects if their risks are not constrained. . . . [I]n 
the event of unfavorable congressional action, we may well be forced to reconsider our role in 
the nuclear industry." Id. (emphasis added). 
'" S. REP. No. 454, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 
2251,2274. 
" [1977] ENVlR. REP. (BNA) 1916. 
" United States V. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 688-90 (1973). 
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data83 to make the contention plausible. 
Had plaintiffs focused on the Act as a tort remedy, they could 
have utilized a simpler, more direct method of satisfying the causa-
tion requirement. Plaintiffs alleged current harms for which Price-
Anderson established the recovery process. They could have alleged 
that the abolition of the limitations on their recovery would have 
increased the likelihood that they would be fully compensated for 
the harms actually suffered due to the plant's operation. Indeed, 
Judge McMillan found this to be the case: "Recoveries in cases of 
injury to and death of a human being have been known in recent 
years to exceed a million dollars and more. Without even consider-
ing property damage, it appears that death or major injuries to 500 
or 1000 people could produce legitimate losses vastly exceeding 
$560,000,000."84 Under this view, the causal relationship between 
the plaintiffs' injuries and Price-Anderson is clearly evident. 
While constitutional standing received substantial analysis by 
Judge McMillan,85 the prudential considerations of standing re-
ceived no explicit attention in his opinion. One could argue that the 
court should not interfere once Congress has declared that a mecha-
nism devised for the promotion of nuclear energy is in the best 
interests of the nation.8ft Nevertheless, "federal courts on occasion 
interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the con-
struction given the document by another branch."87 The severity of 
83 See text at note 79, supra. 
IU Carolina Environmental Study Group v. AEC, 431 F. Supp. 203, 220 (W.D.N.C. 1977) . 
.. Having discussed the necessary injury in fact and causation, thereby laying a foundation 
for constitutional standing, the court also noted other standing tests, such as the Flast nexus 
tests, Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968), the Baker v. Carr "personal stake" test, 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962), and the general discussion of standing in Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 260-64 (1977). Carolina 
Environmental Study Group v. AEC, 431 F. Supp. 203, 218-19 (W.D.N.C. 1977). However, 
none of these tests is apposite to the instant situation. Flast is a taxpayer suit, for which the 
requirements of standing are not necessarily the same as those for plaintiffs in other constitu-
tional challenges. See Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 
U.S. 150, 152 (1970). The Baker test is really a restatement of the Article III mandate of "case 
or controversy," which the Court defined in Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 172-73 (1970), 
as being satisfied by the presence of an injury in fact. And the discussion of standing in 
Arlington Heights merely refines the definition of injury in fact, reiterating the Court's prior 
decisions that it may include non-economic harm, United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 
686-87 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972), but must be a concrete injury, 
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220-22 (1974), fairly 
traceable to the defendant's acts or omissions, Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights 
Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41-2 (1976) . 
.. See text at notes 13-18, 25-29, supra. 
" Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969). 
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the current, personal threat which Price-Anderson's limited liability 
poses to the plaintiffs appears to be sufficient to overcome any pru-
dential basis for the Court's deferring to legislative pronounce-
ments, so that plaintiffs should be deemed to have standing. 
2) Ripeness 
The issue of ripeness concerns the timing of a lawsuit. Like stand-
ing, ripeness has both constitutional and prudential foundations. Its 
constitutional basis rests in the case or controversy requirement of 
Article III,88 for issues must be well defined and clarified before a 
court will undertake its adjudicatory function. 89 The prudential 
basis of ripeness lies in the judiciary's reluctance to decide cases 
which it perceives to contain "problems of prematurity and ab-
stractness; "90 by hearing only real and present problems, the courts 
conserve judicial resources. 91 
Although the Supreme Court has stated that a mere time delay 
between judicial intervention and expected harm will not preclude 
the existence of ripeness,92 no standard delimiting the requirements 
of this justiciability concept has been consistently applied. In suits 
challenging actions of administrative agencies, the Court has de-
scribed a two-part test of ripeness: the issues must be fit for judicial 
decison, and there must be the potential for hardship to the parties 
if judicial consideration is withheld.93 However, no such standard 
has been articulated in other types of challenges. In different cases 
the Court has spoken of the need for establishing the "immediacy" 
of sustaining a direct injury, 94 or the "distinct possibility" of suffer-
ing harm,95 or the "impending" nature of future adversities!8 Such 
seemingly variant tests, however, may be expositions of the same 
two-pronged standard utilized in administrative law ripeness. The 
underlying factors in a determination of the "immediacy," "distinct 
.. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 570 (1947) . 
.. [d. at 574-75; Davis, Ripeness of Governmental Action for Judicial Review, 68 HARV. L. 
REV. 1122, 1134-36 (1955) . 
.. Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 588 (1972). 
" Davis, supra note 89, at 1122; see also Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 
571-72 (1947) . 
.. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 114 (1976); Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 
U.S. 102, 124 (1974) . 
.. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967) . 
.. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13 (1972) . 
•• Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 124 (1974) . 
.. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 117 (1976). 
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possibility," or "impending" nature of the harm require an evalua-
tion of the fitness and clarity of the issues for judicial determination 
and the hardship to the litigants should the court refuse to hear the 
matter. Indeed, this interpretation finds support in recent Supreme 
Court cases on ripeness. 97 
In Vermont Society, the district court assumed that the plaintiffs 
suffered sufficient injury in fact to establish standing,98 but summa-
rily found that the cause of action lacked ripeness because the peti-
tioners failed to "base their claim on a legally protected interest 
which is currently threatened by the Price-Anderson provision. "99 
The court based its ripeness analysis on the plaintiffs' concern about 
the inadequate tort recoveries of persons who in the future may be 
injured in a nuclear incident!OO Not only does this interest fail to 
establish an adequate injury in fact,IOI but it also fails to establish 
a sufficiently ripe controversy. Although the possibility of inade-
quate recoveries in the future may be sufficient to clarify the issues 
for adjudication,102 delaying judicial relief will not create any hard-
" For example, in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Supreme Court invoked the 
"impending" test of ripeness to determine whether it could adjuciate the constitutionality of 
the method of appointing members of the Federal Election Commission. In its opinion, the 
Court noted that the functions of the Commission were either already or soon to be exercised, 
thereby concluding that sufficient facts were present for adjudication. The Court also noted 
Congress' desire to have finally adjudicated as many issues as possible relating to the Com-
mission, implying that failure to find the issues ripe could cause hardship to the parties. [d. 
at 114-17. In the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974), the Court 
invoked the "distinct possibility" test to determine whether it could adjudicate the constitu-
tionality of the Rail Act. Plaintiffs alleged that the forced continuation of existing conditions 
regarding railroad operation would constitute a gradual "taking" of their property without 
just compensation-an "erosion taking." In its opinion, the Court found the issues sufficiently 
clarified even though there had been no definitive determination that an unreasonable 
"erosion taking" had yet occurred. The Court also noted that continued compelled rail opera-
tions would accelerate the erosion of plaintiffs' interests, so that delay in adjudication would 
cause hardship to the parties. [d. at 123-25. 
" Conservation Society of Southern Vermont v. AEC, No. 19-72 (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 1975), 
reprinted in 121 CONGo REC. S22360 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1975) . 
.. [d. The interest which the plaintiffs alleged, but the court rejected as not being their true 
interest, was a general concern in "the consequences of a proliferation of nuclear plants." [d. 
Violation of such an interest apparently states a sufficiently ripe cause of action; the conse-
quences of nuclear proliferation are adequately defined, and any delay in adjudi-cation would 
permit further multiplication of atomic plants to the plaintiffs' hardship. However, violation 
of this interest does not establish a justiciable cause of action since it fails to create a 
constitutionally sufficient injury in fact. See text at note 72, supra. 
,00 Conservation Society of Southern Vermont V. AEC, No. 19-72 (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 1975), 
reprinted in 121 CONGo REc. S22360 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1975). 
'0' See text at notes 73-74, supra. 
'02 Issues likely to be presented include the establishment of the particular type of injury 
(e.g., radiation-induced cancer or genetic damage) and proof of the causation between the 
injury and the nuclear incident. 
(e.g., radiation-induced cancer or genetic damage) and proof of the causation between the 
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ships to plaintiffs who have not yet sought compensation for nuclear 
injuries. The occurrence of the injuries, if any, will be at some inde-
terminate point in the future. 
In Carolina Study Group, plaintiffs alleged the presence of actual, 
personal injuries in the nature of exposure to low level radiation, 
area-wide ecological changes, and fear of sudden, catastrophic oc-
currences. 103 The court compared these harms to those resulting 
from the so-called "erosion taking"104 under the Regional Rail Re-
organization Act. l05 Both situations present the possibility of per-
sonal resources being impaired without the guarantee of adequate 
compensation. l08 Since the possibility of an erosion taking suffi-
ciently frames the issues for adjudication by the court, and since the 
immediacy of the nuclear harms imposes a true hardship on the 
plaintiffs, the court held that the claimants had presented a contro-
versy ripe for judicial review. 
Such an elaborate discussion of ripeness, however, need not have 
been gone into by the court. The Carolina Study Group court noted 
that the plaintiffs suffered "present everyday" injuries. l07 Since the 
plaintiffs alleged that they had already suffered harm,108 the court 
did not have to resort to the erosion taking analogy. The occurrence 
of currently suffered injuries resulting from constant exposure to low 
levels of radiation presented a case that would be ripe for adjudica-
tion by any standard. 
B. The Merits 
Since the Vermont Society plaintiffs failed to establish the justi-
ciability of their cause of action, the court never reached the merits 
of their case. The Carolina Study Group plaintiffs, however, having 
established justiciability, proceeded to a two-pronged attack on the 
constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act as violative of both due 
process and equal protection. 
1) Due Process 
The plaintiffs in the North Carolina suit alleged that the limita-
'03 Carolina Environmental Study Group v. AEC, 431 F. Supp. 203, 209 (W.D.N.C. 1977). 
10' See note 97, supra. 
, .. 45 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (Supp. III 1973). 
,0< Carolina Environmental Study Group v. AEC, 431 F. Supp. 203, 221-22 (W.D.N.C. 
1977). 
'07 [d. at 221. 
'0' See text at notes 75-76, supra. 
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tion on the liability of a nuclear user constituted not only a "taking 
of property without just compensation,"IOD but also a denial to nu-
clear victims of access to the courts and to common law remedies, 110 
and an imposition of geographically non-uniform bankruptcy proce-
dures. 1II The district court did not discuss each of these contentions 
individually, but investigated them together under the general 
heading of due process. Due process issues can be divided into two 
categories-procedural due process, which emphasizes the legiti-
macy and fairness of the procedures utilized by the state to effect a 
given objective,1I2 and substantive due process, which emphasizes 
the basis for the state's interference with the protected rights of the 
individual. II3 The Carolina Study Group case involves both these 
categories. 
a) Procedural Due Process 
Statutory limitations on the pre-existing common law right to a 
full tort recovery, such as exist under the Price-Anderson Act, are 
not new. In the past, such limitations have withstood procedural 
due process challenges, the constitutional analysis often centering 
on the adequacy of the legislation as a quid pro quo for the sup-
planted common law remedy. 114 A quid pro quo analysis weighs the 
benefits of the legislative scheme against those of its common law 
alternative. However, a slight preponderance of benefits for the 
common law scheme does not establish a violation of procedural due 
process; rather, only if there is a significant imbalance of benefits 
does such a violation exist. This weighing process closely parallels 
that utilized in substantive due process analysis.1I5 
, .. Brief for Plaintiff at 17, Carolina Environmental Study Group v. AEC, 431 F. Supp. 
203 (W.D.N.C. 1977). 
110 Id. at 23. 
"' Id. at 25. See also text at note 26, supra. Plaintiffs alleged that the Act imposes different 
bankruptcy procedures for nuclear users and nuclear victims than for other debtors and 
creditors, and that the differences are based solely on the geographic area affected by the 
nuclear incident. 
liZ Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377-79 (1971). 
113 Id. at 379. 
'" See Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitu-
tional Implications, 55 TEx. L. REV. 759, 785 (1977). In this context, quid pro quo refers to 
that which is given up in order to receive that which is desired. 
115 The Court also employs another procedural due process test besides quid pro quo. This 
standard is "flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the situation demands." 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976). The Court focuses on the governmental and 
private interests affected by the legislation as well as on the "fairness and reliability of the 
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The most widely recognized and generally accepted statutory 
modifications of common law remedies are state workmen's com-
pensation laws, which, though varying from state to state, generally 
provide that an injured worker may recover for injuries without 
regard to fault, the amount of his recovery being stipulated by stat-
ute. IIS The employee is assured of compensation, while the employer 
is assured of limited compensation expenses. The classic constitu-
tional justification for workmen's compensation against a due pro-
cess attack appears in New York Central R.R. Co. v. White: ll7 
The statute under consideration sets aside one body of rules only to 
establish another system in its place. If the employee is no longer able 
to recover as much as before in case of being injured through the em-
ployer's negligence, he is entitled to moderate compensation in all cases 
of injury, and has a certain and speedy remedy without the difficulty 
and expense of establishing negligence or proving the amount of the 
damages .... On the other hand, if the employer is left without defense 
respecting the question of fault, he, at the same time, is assured that 
the recovery is limited, and that it goes directly to the relief of the 
designated beneficiary. 118 
The employee's limited recovery is constitutionally justified by the 
relative equivalency of the exchange between employer and em-
ployee. An uncertain method of recovery is replaced by a lesser but 
more certain recovery. 
Another modification of common law remedies occurs in no-fault 
automobile insurance. II. No-fault statutes generally eliminate the 
requirement of fault as a condition of recovery in auto accidents and 
limit the categories and amounts of damages for which an accident 
victim may recover.l20 None of the no-fault statutes has been found 
existing ... procedures, and the probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards." 
Id. at 343. This procedural due process test, analyzing the relative governmental interests and 
personal rights affected by a piece of legislation, closely parallels the substantive due process 
test discussed in Section m(B)(l)(b), infra. 
The Court itself often refers merely to "due process" without explicitly labelling its discus-
sion as either procedural or substantive. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377-80 
(1971) . 
.. I See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-275 et seq. (West 1960); CALIF. CONST. art. 20, 
§ 21; CAL. LAB. CODE § 3201 et seq. (West 1971); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.1 et seq. (Smith-
Hurd 1969); GA. CODE ANN. § 114-10 et seq. (1973). 
117 243 U.S. 188 (1917). 
118 Id. at 201. 
lit See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 627, 738 (West 1970); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 90, 
§ 34-0 (West 1975); Mlelf. COMPo LAws ANN. § 500.3121 et seq. (1!im) . 
• - Kornblum, No-Fault Automobile Insurance-A Comparison of the State Plans and the 
Uniform Act, 8 FORUM 175, 177 (1972). 
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to be constitutionally infirm.121 Similarly, in the Limitation of Ves-
sel Owner's Liability Act,122 Congress has sought to encourage do-
mestic shipping by limiting a shipowner's liability to the value of 
the vessel and the freight pending.123 This Act, however, does not 
establish liability without fault;124 a plaintiff must prove negligence. 
Although the shipowner thus receives the preponderance of benefits 
from the statute, no direct constitutional challenges have suc-
ceeded.125 The Warsaw Convention Treaty, 128 while imposing a limi-
tation on the liability of air lines engaged in "international transpor-
tation, "127 holds the airline company liable for all damages arising 
from accidents "on board the aircraft or in the course of ... em-
barking or disembarking, "128 except where the carrier can establish 
the exercise of due care. 129 Constitutional challenges to the Treaty 
have been as few and as unsuccessful as those against the ship-
owner's limited liability. One court went so far as to dismiss a due 
process challenge with the succinct explanation that "[s]tatutes 
for the limitation of liability are no novelty."13o State laws imposing 
ceilings on medical malpractice liability131 have also been subjected 
to due process attack. Such legislation has on one occasion with-
stood a due process challenge.132 On another, however, a state court 
found that the alleged societal benefits of lower insurance premiums 
and lower medical costs did not outweigh the burdens placed on 
those seriously injured by medical malpractice, and that the statute 
III For example, in Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971), the first challenge 
to the Massachusetts no-fault act, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the legislative trade-
off in no-fault as being "at least as adequate as those provided to New York employers and 
employees in return for rights taken by the act in [New York Central R.R. Co. v. White, 243 
U.S. 188 (1917)]." [d. at 23, 271 N.E.2d at 607. 
lIZ 46 U.S.C. §l81 et seq. (1970). 
lIZ Note, Shipowner's Limited Liability, 3 COLUM. J. LAw & Soc. PROB. 105, 106 (1967). 
114 [d. at 107 n.15; Coleman v. Jahncke Service, 341 F.2d 956, 958 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. 
denied, 382 U.S. 974 (1966). 
IIi One court summarily dismissed the contention that the liability limit violated equal 
protection as having "no sound basis," Murray v. New York Central R.R. Co., 287 F.2d 152, 
153 (2d Cir. 1961), and there have been no due process challenges. 
1ft 49 Stat. 3000 et seq. (Oct. 12, 1929). 
127 [d. at 3019 art. 22. 
1111 [d. art. 17. 
121 [d. art. 20. 
1:10 Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America v. Pan American Airways, 58 F. Supp. 338, 340 
(S.D.N.Y. 1944). 
III See, e.g., IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4204, 39-4205 (1977); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 70 § 101 (Smith-
Hurd 1969). For an explanation of these statutes, see Redish, supra note 114, at 763-65. 
lIZ Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859,555 P.2d 399 (1976). 
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therefore failed to provide an adequate quid pro quo. 133 This analysis 
focuses on the Act's indirect societal benefits rather than on any 
direct individual benefits afforded a medical malpractice victim. 
The court in Carolina Study Group found the Price-Anderson 
trade-off constitutionally inadequate because of the illusory nature 
of the Act's alleged benefits. The AEC and Duke Power asserted 
that Price-Anderson's benefits to nuclear accident victims include: 
certain, albeit possibly partial, recovery;134 prompt release of funds, 
including emergency relief, without prolonged litigation; 135 waiver of 
certain defenses;l38 coverage even if the only person liable is one who 
might otherwise be without substantial insurance protection;137 and 
waiver of any short statute of limitations.13s The true value of these 
benefits, however, is questionable. While the certainty and prompt-
ness of the substituted recovery are important considerations in 
judging the relative equivalence of the quid pro quo,139 an assured, 
rapid award is not guaranteed under Price-Anderson, since a vic-
tim's recovery may remain "partial or contingent" for a time in 
order to provide sufficient. reserves for late filed or lately discovered 
claims.140 A great deal depends on the ability of the district judge 
to devise a workable plan for the disposition of varied and complex 
claims. For example, the plan must estimate the total number and 
severity of potential claims to prevent premature depletion of the 
fund, including future claims by unborn generations for radiation-
induced genetic defects. Further, the waiver of common law defen-
ses is only effective in the aftermath of an "extraordinary nuclear 
occurrence"141 and thus plays no part in claims based on the con-
stant exposure to minor radiation or ecological harms. Finally, al-
though the statute of limitation provisionsl42 provide an additional 
opportunity to file damage claims, no benefits accrue to those whose 
injuries are undiscovered, or undiscoverable, for more than ten 
.33 Wright v. Central Dupage Hospital Association, 63 Ill. 2d. 313, 328, 347 N.E.2d 736,742 
(1976). 
" .. Carolina Environmental Study Group v. AEC, 431 F. Supp. 203, 223 (W.D.N.C. 1977) . 
• 36 [d . 
• 36 [d . 
• 37 [d. at 224 . 
• 38 [d. at 223 . 
• 31 New York Central R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917); Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 
Mass. 1,22,271 N.E. 2d 592, 607 (1971) . 
... 42 U.S.C. § 2210(0) (1970); Carolina Environmental Study Group v. AEC, 431 F. Supp. 
203,224 (W.D.N.C. 1977) . 
• " See text at notes 39-43, supra. 
liZ See text at note 38, supra. 
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years-a class which conceivably would include a large portion of 
those who suffer radiation injury, especially where genetic damage 
is at issue. 143 
Judge McMillan's opinion in Carolina Study Group also empha-
sized distinctions between Price-Anderson and other legislation es-
tablishing alternative tort recovery mechanisms. Workmen's com-
pensation laws and the Warsaw Convention both provide certain 
amounts of compensation; yet, the amount of recovery under Price-
Anderson is not certain because the Act limits aggregate claims 
rather than individual claims, thereby causing the individual recov-
eries to vary with the number of claimants.144 Moreover, while the 
Warsaw Convention and the Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability 
Act give potential passengers and shippers the option of utilizing 
these or other modes of transportation, those living near the nuclear 
plant site have no such readily available choice. 145 These distin-
guishing characteristics weaken the viability of the analogy between 
these valid statutory trade-offs and the Price-Anderson Act. 
Although the benefits of the Price-Anderson Act preponderate to 
the advantage of the nuclear user, and despite the Act's distinction 
from other legislative schemes found to comport with the require-
ments of procedural due process, it is unlikely that the Supreme 
Court will find the Act to be constitutionally infirm. The degree of . 
imbalance between the Act's benefits and those of the common law 
is not significantly greater than that present in the other legislative 
schemes upheld by the courts, such as the Warsaw Convention and 
the Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Act. In Price-Anderson, 
claimants are at least assured of some recovery, even against a 
nuclear user with few assets. 148 In some instances, claimants need 
not prove fault but can recover without regard to certain common 
law defenses which Price-Anderson requires the plant licensee to 
waive. Distinguishing Price-Anderson on a piecemeal basis from the 
other legislative schemes does not establish a sound foundation for 
an analysis of its constitutionality. The quid pro quo standard re-
quires an evaluation of the scheme as a whole, and not as segregated 
into distinguishing components which may be contained in some 
'43 For example, twenty years has been suggested as the latency period for leukemia result-
ing from irradiation. See Estep, supra note 12, at 278. 
". Carolina Environmental Study Group v. AEC, 431 F. Supp. 203, 224 (W.n.N.C. 1977). 
, .. Id. In addition, the Warsaw Convention is an international treaty subject to a different 
degree of analysis than ordinary congressional legislation. Id. 
, .. See Section IV, infra, which discusses the relative ability of Price-Anderson and the 
common law to actually provide compensation funds to those injured in a nuclear incident. 
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acts but not others. Thus, in this more general light, the overall 
weighing of benefits under Price-Anderson is comparable to, if not 
more acceptable than, that in the other valid acts. 
b) Substantive Due Process 
Besides weighing the relative benefits of the Price-Anderson Act 
by a procedural due process analysis, Judge McMillan also appar-
ently utilized a substantive due process test, asserting that "[t]he 
amount of recovery is not rationally related to the potential 
10sses."147 Since substantive due process focuses on the state's in-
terference with the protected rights of the individual,148 the outcome 
of any judicial analysis depends upon the particular interests in-
volved. That is, different standards are applied to legislation involv-
ing different interests. Legislation adversely affecting an economic 
interest or non-fundamental personal right generally can ~ithstand 
a substantive due process challenge if merely rationally related to a 
legitimate governmental concern.14D Over the past forty years, the 
Court has so tolerantly applied the rational basis standard to eco-
nomic interests that a suit gounded on such an interest is extremely 
unlikely to succeed. 150 Legislation which infringes upon a 
"fundamental" personal right, however, can withstand a substan-
tive due process challenge only by furthering a compelling state 
interest.151 To qualify as fundamental, the personal right cannot be 
merely statutorily derived, but must have a constitutional founda-
tion in the Bill of Rights,152 as does, for instance, the right to bodily 
integrity. 153 
\4' Carolina Environmental Study Group v. AEC, 431 F. Supp. 203, 222 (W.D.N.C. 1977). 
'4' Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971). 
'41 See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (economic interest) and Paris Adult 
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973) (non-fundamental personal right). See also 
McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 
1962 SUP. CT. REv. 34 (1962). 
,50 McCloskey, supra note 149, at 36-40. 
,., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). 
'.z According to varying judicial rationales, that foundation must exist either in the explicit 
guarantees of the Bill of Rights, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 530-31 (1965) (Stew-
art, J., dissenting), in the penumbras created by those guarantees, id. at 482-84 (Douglas, 
J., opinion), or in the residuum of interests incorporated into the Bill of Rights by the Ninth 
Amendment, id. at 488 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
,&3 Such a right is implicit in Roe v. Wade, 41OU.S. 113 (1973) and Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479 (1965). Other rights found warranting this special status include the right to 
teach and be taught, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); the right to travel 
abroad, Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); and the right to privacy in one's 
own home, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
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The success on appeal of the Carolina Study Group plaintiffs' 
substantive due process challenge hinges on the definition of the 
interest affected by the Price-Anderson Act. Analyzing the Act as 
either an incentive to nuclear power or a hindrance to full tort 
recovery, the individual interest affected appears to be economic. 154 
Judge McMillan, though recognizing that only the rational relation-
ship test applied, nevertheless held that the Act failed to satisfy this 
lesser constitutional standard. 155 However, the facts indicate that 
Price-Anderson is rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
concern. The Act provides an incentive to the development of nu-
clear energy by lowering industry costs through limiting the poten-
tialliability of the nuclear user. 
To overturn Price-Anderson, plaintiffs must assert the infringe-
ment of a fundamental personal right. In an alternative analysis, 
Judge McMillan concluded that Price-Anderson contravened sub-
stantive due process through the Act's alleged violation of the policy 
created by the Atomic Energy Act to preserve "the health and safety 
of the public."ls8 This interest, however, is statutorily derived and 
thus nonfundamental. Plaintiffs also asserted that the Act violated 
the fundamental right to sue,157 citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 158 
which held that indigents could not be denied access to the courts 
to obtain a divorce due to their inability to pay a filing fee. The 
Boddie Court, however, emphasized the state's monopoly over ~ar­
riage and divorce, centering its decision on the fundamentality of 
the marital relation. More recently, United States v. Kras l59 held 
that there is no fundamental right to sue for a recomposition in 
bankruptcy. no The Court's decisions as a whole, therefore, do not 
establish the existence of an absolute constitutional right to sue. 
Nonetheless, a fundamental right against invasion of one's bodily 
integrity does exist, and it encompasses both security from physical 
intrusions and personal choice in matters concerning one's body.181 
The Carolina Study Group court alluded to this privacy interest, 
... See Brief for Plaintiffs at 17, Carolina Environmental Study Group v. AEC, 431 F. Supp. 
203 (W.D.N.C. 1977) and Brief for Federal Defendant at 15, id . 
• 11 Carolina Environmental Study Group v. AEC, 431 F. Supp. 203, 222 (W.D.N.C. 1977) . 
• 11 [d . 
• 57 Brief for Plaintiffs at 24, Carolina Environmental Study Group v. AEC, 431 F. Supp. 
203 (W.D.N.C. 1977) . 
• SI 401 U.S. 371 (1971) . 
• " 409 U.S. 434 (1973) . 
• 11 [d. at 452 . 
••• See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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referring to the intrusion of nuclear radiation into the homes of the 
plaintiffs and the invasion of foreign particles into their bodies. 162 
The intangibility of radiation, however, makes it difficult to liken 
its presence in one's home and person to an "invasion of bodily 
integrity," which generally encompasses tangible physical intru-
sions. 163 Carrying the analogy to its logical extreme, the presence of 
sonic booms or television and radio signals could also constitute 
such invasions. Nor are the plaintiffs prevented from making deci-
sions about their own bodies as in the abortion cases, since they may 
remove themselves from the area of the nuclear radiation. 164 It thus 
does not appear that the plaintiffs in the present case can fashion a 
constitutional violation of a fundamental right. 
Even assuming that plaintiffs could establish the infringement of 
some fundamental right, Price-Anderson would still not violate sub-
stantive due process if it furthers a compelling state interest. The 
Supreme Court has not offered a general definition of what govern-
mental interests are compelling. A mere concern for ease of judicial 
or administrative procedures is not compelling,165 nor is the state's 
interest in conserving the public fisc. 166 However, the state's inter-
ests in the health of a mother after the first trimester of pregnancyl67 
and in the life of a fetus after the second trimesterl68 are compelling, 
thus suggesting that a state is more likely to have a compelling 
interest in its concern for human life or health than in its concern 
for property. In the Price-Anderson Act, the governmental interests 
basically deal with property, either the promotion of capital invest-
ment in nuclear power or the amount of compensation allowable to 
nuclear tort plaintiffs. Although a purpose of the Atomic Energy Act 
'62 "These radioactive emissions will invade the air and water and the bodies and genes of 
plaintiffs and others in the neighborhood." Carolina Environmental Study Group v. AEC, 
431 F. Supp. 203, 220 (W.D.N.C. 1977). 
'" The state's "invasion of bodily integrity" in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), concerned 
physical restraint from the ability to have a legal abortion, while in Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479 (1965), the state's intrusion sought to restrain any couple from obtaining contra-
ceptives. Such inability to procure an abortion or contraceptives produces greater conscious-
ness of an actual intrusion than does the imperceptible presence of radiation in one's home. 
". While those living near a nuclear plant do not have a "readily available choice" of 
removing themselves from the presence of the radiation, see text at note 145, supra, such a 
move is, at least, theoretically possible. For those seeking an abortion or contraceptives, not 
even a theoretical possibility existed to legally circumvent the state's prohibitions. 
'" Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969). 
'" Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1970). 
,,7 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973). 
UK [d. 
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as a whole is the protection of the public health and safety,189 such 
a concern only tangentially relates to Price-Anderson itself, which 
focuses not on the preservation of the public health but on remedial 
measures after its disruption. The Act, therefore, does not further a 
compelling state interest. Thus, if the Carolina Study Group plain-
tiffs could establish the presence of a fu~damental right, its in-
fringement by the Price-Anderson Act would contravene substan-
tive due process. As previously demonstrated, however, the estab-
lishment of a fundamental right is unlikely. 
2) Equal Protection 
Plaintiffs in Carolina Study Group also attacked the Price-
Anderson Act as violating the guarantee of equal protection of the 
laws embodied in the Fifth Amendm~nt.17o In essence, equal protec-
tion ensures that people similarly situated will be similarly treated. 
The first step in equal protection analysis is the identification of 
three distinct factors: (1) the character of the· classification in ques-
tion, (2) the individual interests affected by the classification, and 
(3) the governmental interests asserted in support of the classifica-
tion.171 The judicial standard of review applicable to a particular 
case depends on the discovered nature of these factors. 
The most usual standard of equal protection review is the 
"minimum rationality" standard. 172 If a rational relationship exists 
between the classification employed and the governmental interest 
sought to be furthered, the test is met. If, however, the classification 
used by the lawmakers is defined as "suspect"173-that is, based 
upon factors such as race, ethnic origin, or alienage-or if the indi-
vidual interests affected by the classification are defined as 
"fundamental, "174 a more rigorous standard, the "strict scrutiny" 
test, must be satisfied.n5 Under strict scrutiny, the state must show 
'II 42 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (1970). 
". The same guarantee of equal protection applicable to the states under the Fourteenth 
Amendment is applicable to the federal government under the Fifth Amendment. Bolling v. 
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). 
'" See Dunn v. Blumstein, 465 U.S. 330, 335 (1972). See also Tussman & ten Broek, The 
Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341 (1949). 
'"~ The rational relationship standard is applied to economic legislation. Williamson v. Lee 
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955). See also Developments in the Law-Equal 
Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1077-87 (1969). 
,73 E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage) and Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (race). 
171 E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336, 338 (1972) (franchise, right to travel); 
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (franchise). 
,75 See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972). 
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that its legislatively-created classification is necessary to further a 
compelling governmental interest. 176 
Judge McMillan stated that Price-Anderson distinguishes be-
tween those living near a nuclear power plant and those who do not. 
He found this classification to be based on "geographical happenst-
ance," remarking that the burden of the Act is placed "upon people 
who happen to live in the areas which may be touched by radioac-
tive debris, "177 and determined that the governmental interest be-
hind the legislation was the encouragement of nuclear power pro-
duction. 178 On the basis of these definitions, the judge correctly in-
voked the minimum rationality test, yet concluded that Price-
Anderson violated the plaintiffs' right to equal protection by 
"irrationally"179 placing the burden of society's benefits from nu-
clear power on those who are injured by radioactive debris. 
There are problems with this analysis, however. Any recovery 
mechanism contains the possibility of judgment-proof defendants. 
Even under the common law, if the nuclear user has insufficient 
\71 Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973) (50 day durational voter residency requirement 
was "necessary" to promote the State's "important interest in accurate voter lists"); Tribe, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1000-02 (1978). For a discussion of compelling state interests, 
see text at notes 165-68, supra. 
Intermediate equal protection tests have also been postulated as a potential middle ground 
between the two alternatives discussed in the text. These would be used when the legislative 
classification does not qualify as suspect but yet deserves more scrutiny than the rational 
relationship test provides. These intermediate tests have been implicitly utilized by the 
Court. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-22 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In 
his dissent in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), 
Justice Marshall wrote: 
A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that it has applied a spectrum 
of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal Protection 
Clause. This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the particular classifications, 
depending, I believe, on the constitutional and societal importance of the interest ad-
versely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular 
classification is drawn. Id. at 98-99. 
Varying characterizations of these intermediate standards have been suggested. Under the 
"means-focus" test, the legislative classification must "substantially further" governmental 
ends. Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer 
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 20-24 (1972). Alternatively, under the "demonstrable 
basis standard," a statute is validated only if "the means used bear a factually demonstrable 
relationship to a state interest capable of withstanding analysis." Nowak, Realigning the 
Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral and Permis-
sive Classifications, 62 GEO. L. J. 1071, 1081, 1092-94 (1974). Plaintiffs in Carolina Study 
Group did not invoke an'intermediate equal protection test, nor did the court utilize one in 
its analysis. 
177 Carolina Environmental Study Group v. AEC, 431 F. Supp. 203, 225 (W.D.N.C. 1977). 
\7. Id. 
\71 Id. 
1978] PRICE-ANDERSON ACT 591 
assets to cover all claims, the burden of operating nuclear plants will 
be placed on the less-than-fully compensated victims}80 Moreover, 
the mere presence of this possibility does not make the scheme 
irrational. Rather, the court should consider that the encourage-
ment of nuclear power is inherently an economic decision by Con-
gress, the kind of decision which the judic.iary typically leaves to 
legislative wisdom.181 Congress certainly did not act unreasonably in 
devising a compensation scheme which places no greater potential 
burden on nuclear tort victims than do other recovery mechanisms. 
Recognizing this difficulty in invalidating Price-Anderson on 
equal protection grounds, plaintiffs defined the governmental inter-
est furthered by Price-Anderson as a desire to ensure adequate tort 
recoveries.182 Their objection to the Act focused on the distinction 
drawn between nuclear tort victims, whose recoveries are limited by 
Price-Anderson, and other tort victims, whose recoveries have no 
comparable ceiling. Judge McMillan alluded to this analysis when 
he asserted that "[ t]he Act irrationally and unreasonably places a 
greater burden upon people damaged by nuclear accidents than 
upon people damaged by other types of accidents, such as motor 
vehicle or electrical accidents, involving power companies."I83 Con-
sidering the conceivably astronomic damage claims resulting from 
a nuclear catastrophe, however, a governmental effort to ensure 
some proportional compensation to all claimants is far from irra-
tional. Price-Anderson, therefore, should satisfy the rational basis 
test whether the governmental interest is oriented toward either 
economic and policy concerns or the tort recoveries and remedies of 
nuclear accident victims. 
Judge McMillan also utilized a "less drastic means" analysis, an 
aspect of the strict scrutiny standard which investigates whether the 
asserted governmental objective can be accomplished by "less re-
strictive means."184 The judge wrote that "[t]he limitation [on 
liability] is unnecessary to serve any legitimate public purpose. 
Other arrangements rationally related to the interests asserted 
, .. See Section IV, infra. 
,., See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955). 
'82 See Brief for Plaintiffs at 22, Carolina Environmental Study Group v. AEC, 431 F. Supp. 
203 (W.D.N.C. 1977). 
'83 Carolina Environmental Study Group v. AEC, 431 F. Supp. 203, 225 (W.D.N.C. 1977). 
,84 1d. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 
488 (1960); see also Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 172, at 1101-04 
and Gunther, supra note 176, at 21. 
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could easily be devised."18Ii However, there does not appear to be any 
basis for invoking a stricter standard than the rational basis test, 
since neither a suspect classification nor a violation of any funda-
mental right is involved.188 Consequently, the existence of any viola-
tion of equal protection is unlikely. 
IV. THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT AND THE COMMON LAW 
Challenges to Price-Andeson evidently are based on the belief 
that victims of a nuclear catastrophe would be in a better position 
without the legislation in effect. Congress, as evidenced by its sev-
eral extensions of the Act, has determined otherwise. A comparison 
of the benefits of the Act and those of its common law alternative 
would aid all persons concerned with Price-Anderson in determining 
whether a continuation of the legislation would be in the best inter-
ests of the nation. Further, such an analysis helps in determining 
the rationality of the Act.187 
Both proponents and opponents of the Price-Anderson Act agree 
that any recovery mechanism for nuclear tort victims should accom-
plish four basic goals: 188 (1) provide adequate compensation, (2) 
spread the risk as much as possible, (3) avoid the forced contribu-
tion by non-beneficiaries of atomic energy to its maintenance-that 
is, decrease the externalization of atomic energy's cost, and (4) 
avoid undue cost.18t The optimum tort recovery system would satisfy 
all of these objectives. 
Under the common law, tort victims recover to the full extent of 
their damages as ascertained by a court, provided the defendant is 
not partially or totally judgement-proof. Under Price-Anderson, 
nuclear accident victims recover a proportion of the indemnity fund, 
depending on the number and amount of claims and the allocation 
system devised by the district court. Ito While both mechanisms pro-
vide the potentiality for full recovery, neither system guarantees 
.15 Carolina Environmental Study Group v. AEC, 431 F. Supp. 203, 225 (W.D.N.C. 1977) . 
• 11 It is, moreover, unlikely that the present Supreme Court will add to the list of suspect 
classifications or fundamental rights. See Gunther, supra note 176, at 12 . 
• 07 See text at notes 146, 180-81, supra . 
... Both the Senate Committee and Senator Tunney, although holding opposite views 
regarding the extension of Price-Anderson, cited with approval the criteria propounded by 
the Columbia Legislative Drafting Research Fund for evaluating any recovery mechanism for 
the victims of a nuclear disaster. S. REP. No. 454, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1975] 
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2251, 2257, 2276. 
·"Id . 
• 11 42 U.S.C. § 2210(0) (1970). See text at note 47, supra. 
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complete reimbursement to the nuclear accident victim; in either 
instance, total claims may exceed the assets available for disburse-
ment. The insolvency of the nuclear user is as possible as the ex-
haustion of the $560 million fund}91 
Although the amount of recovery under either system could be 
adequate, claims under the Price-Anderson Act and the common 
law may differ in the likelihood of the plaintiffs' receiving any recov-
ery at all. Price-Anderson utilizes a system of waivers of potential 
defenses by the atomic users. The common law utilizes the remedy 
of strict liability for "ultrahazardous activities;"192 this doctrine 
imposes liability without regard to fault for damages due to activi-
ties "not a matter of common usage" and that involve- "a risk of 
serious harm to the person, land or chattels of others which cannot 
be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care."193 In comparing 
the Act to its common law alternative, the pivotal question is 
whether state courts would, in the absence of Price-Anderson, de-
nominate the operation of nuclear power plants as an ultrahazar-
dous activity. One noted authority believed "with a good deal of 
confidence"19. that they would. But as atomic energy proliferates 
and becomes more and more "a matter of common usage," the 
prediction may prove false, especially if atomic power's good safety 
record continues. liS Technological advances have caused some states 
to move such industries as the airlines from strict liability to an 
ordinary negligence standard. l88 Courts may, at some point in the 
future, determine that nuclear power is not an ultrahazardous activ-
ity, thereby requiring nuclear victims to prove fault in order to 
recover damages. 
A common law tort recovery would, in so far as the nuclear victim 
recovers against the nuclear user's assets or insurance, pass the risk 
of loss to the nuclear power operator and, through increased rates, 
lit Memo, supra note 25, at S22363. 
tl2 See Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868); Yom mer v. McKenzie, 255 Md. 220, 
257 A. 2d 138 (1969); Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 519. 
t.3 Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 520. 
t14 PROSSER, TORTS 516 (4th Edition 1971). 
til How good this safety record may actually be is open to dispute. The sixty plants now 
on line have accumulated over 220 reactor years without a death or serious injury outside the 
reactor building. Critics say this is due to sheer luck, and point to some near-catastrophic 
accidents at Brown's Ferry, Alabama and Morris, lllinois. See How Safe is Safe Enough?, 
N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 20,1976 at 54. 
til See, e.g., Wood v. United Airlines, Inc., 32 Misc. 2d 955, 960, 223 N.Y.S.2d 692, 697 
(Sup. Ct. 1961), affirmed memo 16 App. Div. 2d 659, 226 N.Y.S.2d 1022, appeal dismissed 
11 N.Y.2d 1053, 230 N.Y.S.2d 207,184 N.E.2d 180; PROSSER, TORTS 514-16 (4th Edition 1971). 
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to the energy consumer. To the extent actual damages exceed the 
realized recovery, the risk of loss is also spread to the accident 
victim. Under Price-Anderson, the risk of loss due to the operation 
of atomic plants may be passed to three distinct groups: the nuclear 
user and his customers (up to the amount of his insurance coverage), 
the government and its taxpayers (up to the amount of government 
indemnification), and the accident victims (up to the amount of his 
unrecovered losses). Price-Anderson thus adds an extra group-the 
government and its taxpayers-over which to spread the risk of 
operating nuclear plants .. 
As the risk of loss is spread over more non-nuclear user groups, 
more non-beneficiaries of atomic energy are required to bear the cost 
of its maintenance, thereby increasing the externalization of the 
cost of nuclear power. However, the government and its taxpayers, 
the additional group sharing the loss under Price-Anderson, argua-
bly qualify as beneficiaries of nuclear power in light of the societal 
benefits of art increased energy supply. Under this view, Price-
Anderson would cause no greater externalization of cost than its 
common law alternative. 
In the absence of Price-Anderson, the cost of operating nuclear 
plants would probably rise, perhaps to prohibitive levels, depending 
on the cost of the added insurance users would have to purchase. 197 
This higher price tag must be compared to the current scheme 
which costs the government nothing to administer and costs the 
nuclear user only nominal indemnity fees. In terms of minimizing 
117 Ralph Nader contends that elimination of the Price-Anderson Act would make nuclear 
power economically unfeasible. [1977] ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1916. However, private insurance 
provides coverage of between $250 million and $300 million per accident for the airline 
industry, and there is no reason why similar amounts would not be available to nuclear users 
at reasonable cost, especially given their safety record. See S. REP. No. 454, 94th Cong., 1st 
Sess., reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONGo & An. NEWS 2251, 2273. In his statement dissent-
ing from the Congress' 1975 extension of Price-Anderson, Senator Tunney estimated, based 
on conversations with insurance experts, that coverage of $500 million for the average 1000 
megawatt nuclear power plant would cost only an extra one tenth mill per kilowatt hour.ld. 
at 2273-74. The availability of such insurance should be no problem either. In 1957, when 
Price-Anderson was first enacted, the Senate Committee Report mentioned that the possibil-
ity of obtaining insurance from Lloyd's of London had been considered, but rejected in favor 
of limiting the required coverage to that available in the United States. S. REp. No. 296, 85th 
Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1957] U.S. CODE CONGo & An. NEWS 1803, 1817. It appears 
that, even at that early stage, the insurance companies recognized the profit potential of 
nuclear insurance and wanted to be assured of a share in that business, albeit a safely limited 
share. 
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costs, then, Price-Anderson appears to be superior to the common 
law. ISS 
In sum, the mechanics of recovery under the common law neces-
sarily may not be more equitable than the system developed under 
the Price-Anderson Act. Analyses based solely on the probable se-
verity of a nuclear accident and the size of the resultant claims fail 
to investigate the actual funds available under the various mecha-
nisms of recovery and thus are not particularly helpful in comparing 
Price-Anderson with its common law alternative. Serious doubts 
exist as to the superiority of the common law over Price-Anderson, 
in terms of providing actual money damages to nuclear accident 
victims, thereby providing evidence of the Act's rationality. More-
over, the inadequacy of the common law recovery mechanism which 
would exist in the event Price-Anderson is declared unconstitutional 
demonstrates the need for a comprehensive legislative approach to 
II. The various relationships determining the comparative benefits of the recovery systems 
under the Price-Anderson Act and the common law may be schematically depicted as follows: 
CLAIMS = f (PLANT LOCATION, WEATHER, REACTOR SIZE ... ) 
RECOVERY FUND = f (ASSETS, INSURANCE) CL . 
RECOVERY FUND = f (DEFERRED PREMIUMS, INSURANCE, INDEMNITY) 
PA 
f( ) means "function or' 
CL means "common law" 
PA means "Price-Anderson" 
The amount of benefits available under the common law may be no greater than the recovery 
provided under the Price-Anderson Act, depending upon the interrelation of certain variables. 
The total amount of recovery funds available to compensate victims under the common law 
would depend on the assets of the nuclear user and his insurance coverage, while under Price-
Anderson the total amount of recovery funds would depend on the deferred premium pay-
ments, the insurance available, and the government indemnity. The total amount of claims 
is, of course, proportional to the severity of the accident, which in turn is a function of such 
factors as plant location, weather, and size of the reactor. Green, supra note 16, at 481. 
In any given accident, to the extent CLAIMS exceeds the Price-Anderson recovery fund 
more than CLAIMS exceeds the common law recovery fund, the common law provides greater 
compensation to accident victims. But the recovery fund under Price-Anderson may exceed 
the recovery fund under the common law if the user's assets are small or if the deferred 
premiums are large. Moreover, if the ASSETS and INSURANCE factors under the common 
law generate greater funds than the DEFERRED PREMIUMS and INSURANCE factors 
under Price-Anderson, the common law would externalize the cost of nuclear power to a lesser 
degree than Price-Anderson. However, Price-Anderson is likely to externalize the cost of 
nuclear power to a lesser degree than the common law if the accident involves a small nuclear 
user or there are many reactors on line to pay deferred premiums. In addition, all victims 
may not share in the common law recovery fund if strict liability is not recognized by the 
state courts, just as all may not share in Price-Anderson's recovery fund if defenses are not 
waived in the absence of the declaration of an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence." 
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the continuing problem of nuclear liability rather than an appeal to 
judicial processes. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Even if the Carolina Study Group court correctly determined that 
the plaintiffs had established standing and the ripeness of their 
cause of action, it erroneously declared Price-Anderson violative of 
both the due process and equal protection provisions of the federal 
Constitution. Whether the purpose of the Act is the encouragement 
of nuclear power or the provision of compensation to nuclear acci-
dent victims, the Act is a reasonable mechanism for accomplishing 
its goals. 
While the probable resurrection of the Price-Anderson Act by the 
Supreme Court might be a psychological blow to environmentalists, 
its true impact on their cause should not be overstated. Even were 
the Act ultimately to fall, those groups seeking a moratorium on the 
continued expansion of nuclear power would not have won their 
goal. The pressures underlying the demand for nuclear power would 
remain. ISS Although various groups have tried to portray the limited 
remedies of nuclear victims under Price-Anderson as a cause of 
atomic plant proliferation, and although it may indeed have con-
tributed to such growth in the industry's infancy, the continuing 
viability of that contention is doubtful. 200 
Price-Anderson should be perceived simply as a modification of 
common law remedies in a situation where Congress deems them 
inadequate. This outlook properly focuses on the basic inquiry, 
whether the Act provides as adequate a recovery mechanism for 
victims of a nuclear accident as does the common law, rather than 
on whether the government should promote nuclear power through 
Price-Anderson's limited liability. In the event the Act is declared 
unconstitutional, the remedies of the nuclear accident victim would 
change, but not necessarily improve. This alteration of remedies 
would have no effect on nuclear policy. Indeed, such a decision 
would not affect in any way the policy discussion as to whether the 
creation of potential "nuclear accident victims" should be permit-
ted to continue. 
'" See How Safe is Safe Enough? N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 20, 1976, at 54; Great Nuclear 
Debate, TIME, Dec. 8, 1975, at 36. 
zoo See text at notes 79-81, supra. 
